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The statute of limitations for an action alleging injury to another's
rights, not arising from a contractual agreement, is two years.
Additionally, a Kansas statute delineates that accrual of the cause of
action does not begin until the act giving rise to the cause of action
first causes substantial injury. The court had previously held that
"substantial injury" meant the victim must suffer a sufficient
ascertainable injury, regardless of the extent of that injury.
The court compared this situation with the 1996 decision in
Johnson v. Board of Pratt County Commissioners, which differed factually.
The Johnson court held that the statute of limitations did not
commence until after the 1991 flood; therefore, the cause of action
was not barred. In that case, a flood occurred in 1988, and the
plaintiffs promptly complained to the County. The County then took
action to prevent any future problems. Flooding again occurred in
1991, at which point the plaintiffs realized that the County had not
rectified the problem. Consequently, they filed suit.
The court also compared this situation with the decision of Isnard
v. City of Coffeyville. There the court held that the plaintiffs' injuries
due to flooding were reasonably ascertainable before the suit was filed
in October of 1991. Therefore, the two-year statute of limitations
barred their cause of action. The court reasoned that past experiences
gave the plaintiffs satisfactory knowledge before October 1991 to
estimate the amount of rain needed to cause an overflow in the storm
sewer. Furthermore, the court held that the underground storm sewer
was a permanent structure, and the entire system needed replacement
in order to fix the flooding problem.
The court held that Isnardwas the applicable and controlling case.
The court stated that even if portions of the drainage system were
classified temporary, the classification did not preclude the entire
Second and Michigan Street Drainage System from being
characterized as a permanent structure. The homeowners had prior
knowledge of the flooding, and the City had not promised or tried to
abate the flooding. Consequently, the statute of limitations began to
run in 1993, thus barring the homeowners' cause of action.
Sara Franklin

LOUISIANA
Crump v. Sabine River Auth., 737 So.2d 720 (La. 1999) (holding that
the continued presence of a canal and the consequent diversion of
water from a bayou did not constitute a continuing tort since those
were continuous ill effects, not unlawful acts).
Sarah Crump sold eighteen of her sixty acres to Sabine River
Authority ("Authority") in 1965. The Authority used this land to
construct the Toledo Bend Reservoir. The McDonald Bayou traversed
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Crump's land and acted as an approximate boundary between
Crump's land to the north and Authority's land to the south.
Authority leased back an area of the land to Crump so that she could
retain access to either the Toledo Bend Reservoir or the Sabine River
by way of McDonald Bayou. In 1969, Crump's attorney requested that
the Authority notify Crump if any neighboring landowners sought
permission to dredge a canal and use the bayou crossing Crump's
land. The Authority responded that there was no record of any such
application. In 1971, without a permit, neighboring landowners dug a
canal intersecting McDonald Bayou and the reservoir. This canal
altered the flow of water in the bayou and ultimately caused the
portion on Crump's land to dry up. Consequently, Crump lost her
ability to access Toledo Bend Lake via her property.
After several unsuccessful attempts to rectify the problem with the
Authority's cooperation and recourse to the Board of Commissioners,
Crump filed a negligence action in 1992 against the Authority seeking
damages and a mandatory injunction.
Crump alleged that the
Authority was obligated to prevent the digging of the channel by the
neighboring owners and had a subsequent duty to restore McDonald
Bayou to its original condition. Thus, Crump argued that the
continued existence of the canal and Authority's continued refusal to
fix the situation resulted in the continuing damage of limited
accessibility and constituted continuing tortious conduct. Crump also
alleged that she suffered emotional and financial damages as a direct
result of the Authority's refusals to correct the problem.
The trial court found in favor of Crump, and she received
$100,800 in damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed and determined
that Crump's claim under the theory of continuing tort had not
prescribed because she continuously sought rectification from the'
Authority. The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted certiorari.
The court stated that an action in continuing tort required the
operating cause of the injury to be a continuous one resulting in
continuous damages. If the operating cause was not continuous, then
prescription ran from the date that the injured party became aware of
or should have become aware of such harm. Relying on precedent
from the turn of the century, the supreme court found the operating
cause of injury occurred when the neighboring land owners actually
dug the canal. The canal's continued presence and the consequent
continuous diversion of water from McDonald Bayou were continuous
ill effects and not continuous unlawful acts. It followed that the oneyear prescriptive period applicable to negligence actions involving
damage to immovable property began to run when damage to Crump
became apparent. The supreme court determined that Crump
discovered her damages no later than 1972. Since this suit was filed
twenty years later, Crump's negligence action had prescribed.
Crump's alternative arguments also failed. Crump argued that the
running of prescription was interrupted when Authority acknowledged
that the canal was illegally constructed and represented that it would
help repair the damage.
The supreme court held that mere
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recognition of a disputable claim and humanitarian or charitable
gestures do not constitute acknowledgments, halting the progress of
prescription.
Crump alternatively argued that her inaction was
justified because the employees of the Authority assured her they were
going to fix the problem, ultimately lulling her into a course of
inaction. The supreme court determined that Crump's allegations did
not prevent the running of prescription. Therefore, because Crump's
negligence action had prescribed, the supreme court dismissed her
suit.
Vanessa L. Condra

MAINE
Maddocks v. Giles, 728 A.2d 150 (Me. 1999) (holding that Maine
continues to follow the absolute dominion rule).
Giles owned and operated a gravel pit adjacent to the Maddockses'
property.
Although the Maddockses' did not live there, an
underground spring historically produced large quantities of water
beneath this property. The Maddockses filed a complaint in 1994
alleging that Giles' gravel excavation depleted the spring's water.
Prior to trial, the court recognized the general rule that although a
landowner had the right to use his land for lawful purposes, he may
not disrupt a watercourse causing injury to neighboring landowners.
At trial, the jury preliminarily determined whether the spring
constituted a watercourse. A watercourse must have a substantial and
well defined existence. Water in a watercourse must flow in a specific
direction in a regular channel, with a bed and banks and sides. Also, it
generally flows into another body of water. The jury found that the
spring under the Maddockses property was not a watercourse and the
court granted judgment to Giles.
On appeal, the Maddockses asked the court to abandon the
dominion rule in favor of groundwater rules set forth in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. The dominion rule held that the
landowner had absolute ownership of the groundwater beneath his
land, similar to the soils and rocks surrounding it. Under this rule, a
landowner has no liability for digging a well on his property while
causing percolating water of his neighbor's property to dry up. The
Maddockses argued that the dominion rule was based on faulty
science, other jurisdictions have used modern science as the basis for
abandoning this rule, and only a few jurisdictions continue to follow it.
This court declined to reject the dominion rule. First, they found
the rule still suitable for use in Maine; even if modern science changed
views on groundwater, the rule could still operate adequately in Maine.
Furthermore, the court acknowledged that landowners have relied on
this rule for over a century. Absent proof of its counterproductivity,

